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Can you picture yourself being compelled to make a choice
between adhering to the tenets of your religious faith and maintaining
your employment?I Moreover, would you ever think that it was possible
for your employer to deny you the opportunity to exercise your faith in
the work environment, offer very little justification for such a
deprivation, and then summarily terminate your employment for
adhering to the dictates of your religion? These questions are neither
fanciful nor divorced from reality.2 The inquiries themselves seem to
Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2012.
1. See Protecting American Employees From Workplace Discrimination:
Hearing on H.R. 1431 Before the H. Education and Labor Subcomm. on Health,
Employment, Labor and Pensions, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Richard T.
Foltin, Legislative Director and Counsel, Office of Government and International
Affairs, The American Jewish Committee), available at http://frwebgate.access.
gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110 house hearings&docid=f:40606.pdf
[hereinafter Foltin] (stating that surrounding a claim for religious discrimination in
the workplace "is the story of an American forced to choose between his or her
livelihood and faith. Frequently, those who put their faith first suffer catastrophic
losses, including their homes, their health insurance, their ability to help their
children through college, and, in some particularly sad situations, their marriages.").
2. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. GEO Group, Inc., 616 F.3d 265, 277 (3d Cir. 2010)
(holding that a private employer did not, under the dictates of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, have to allow female workers to wear Muslim headscarves
during the course of employment at a prison because of general safety issues).
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reflect the very real and agonizing situation in which some of America's
prison workers have found themselves over at least the last decade. The
source of this problem can be attributed, at least in part, to the very weak
"undue hardship"4 standard advanced through the "amended" portion' of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).6 In essence, the
standard allows employers to deny the religious expression rights of
employees if their acts of expression cause a "de minimis " disruption in
the work environment.7 As a result, the right to religious expression of
prison employees, particularly in the areas of religious clothing and
grooming practices,' appears to be an area susceptible to subordination
of other interests.9 In particular, this reality has emerged as a result of the
3. See, e.g., GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 267; Booth v. Maryland, 327 F.3d 377,
380-82 (4th Cir. 2003) (implying that Title VIll would not be violated when state
officials adhere to a grooming policy that results in the preclusion of a prison worker
from wearing religiously-motivated dreadlocks in the workplace due to security
concerns).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006). One member of Congress has explained, "[i]n
1972, Congress amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to require employers to
reasonably accommodate an employee's religious practice or observance unless
doing so would impose an undue hardship on the employer." 145 CONG. REC. S 11,
647 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1999) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
5. GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 267.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
7. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977); see also
Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 67-70 (1986) (affirming the low
threshold for showing sufficient accommodation under Title VII).
8. See GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 274-75 (holding that a private employer did
not, under the dictates of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, have to allow
female workers to wear Muslim headscarves during the course of employment at a
prison because of general safety issues); Booth, 327 F.3d at 380-82 (implying that
Title VII would not be violated when State officials adhere to a grooming policy that
results in the preclusion of a prison worker from wearing religiously-motivated
dreadlocks in the workplace due to security concerns). It is important to note that the
Fourth Circuit's decision in Booth largely centers on the fact that Booth brought his
claims against the defendants under various federal and state laws and not Title Vil.
Id. at 378. However, the case is cited here and is used in this overall analysis of Title
VII due to the decision's support for the general security concerns offered by the
defendants and the author of this Note's assertion that these security interests would
have been sufficient under Title VII. See id. at 381; discussion infra Part II.
9. See GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 275 ("[T]he prison has an overriding
responsibility to ensure the safety of its prisoners, its staff, and the visitors. A prison
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collision between the security interests that prisons maintain and the
apparently legitimate desires of employees therein to express their
individual faiths during the course of employment.' 0 Unfortunately, as
the relatively recent cases, Booth v. Maryland" and E.E.O.C. v. GEO
Group, Inc.12 demonstrate, the weak protections provided by Title VII
seem to create a situation in which prison workers face a significant
burden in showing that their interests in religious expression equal or
trump the proffered security interests of the nation's prisons.13
Fortunately, the Workplace Religious Freedom Act (WFRA), 14 a
piece of proposed national legislation, appeared to receive ongoing
consideration in recent sessions of Congress.16 As the WRFA aims to
is not a summer camp and prison officials have the unenviable task of preserving
order in difficult circumstances.").
10. See Booth, 327 F.3d at 381 ("There is no evidence that the Division
developed the policy to regulate or prohibit religious activities, including Booth's
practice of Rastafarianism, and the defendants presented persuasive evidence that
DCD 50-43 was likely adopted for the neutral secular purposes of promoting public
safety, discipline, and esprit de corps.").
11. 327 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 2003).
12. 616 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2010).
13. See id. at 274-77 (implying that, while the purported safety concerns of the
prison could be considered tenuous, they were sufficient to overcome employees'
Title VII claims); Booth, 327 F.3d at 380-81 (suggesting that the security interests
underlying the applicable prison policy were sufficient in and of themselves to
overcome Booth's religiously-motivated grooming practices).
14. Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2007, H.R. 1431, 110th Cong.
(2007). It is important to note that Senator John F. Kerry (D-Ma.) introduced a
version of the WRFA before the United States Senate in 2008, Workplace Religious
Freedom Act of 2008, S. 3628, 110th Cong. (2008), and 2010, Workplace Religious
Freedom Act of 2010, S. 4046, 111th Cong. (2010). Given the overall arguments of
this Note and the fact that Senator Kerry's recent versions of the WRFA do not
appear to affect the positions advanced herein surrounding potential religious
expression protections for prison workers, H.R. 1431 and commentary on this
version of the WRFA will be predominantly cited throughout this Note. The reader
should take into account this citation decision when considering the perspectives
offered in this Note from cited sources regarding the WRFA. Further information
regarding this choice and background on these different versions of the WRFA is
discussed elsewhere in this Note. See discussion infra Part II.
15. See H.R. 1431.
16. Gretchen S. Futrell, Note, Bring Your Dogma to Work Day: The
Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2007 and the Public Workplace, 7 FIRST
AMEND. L. REv. 373, 373 (2009).
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amend" Title VII by heightening the standard an employer must
overcome before lawfully denying certain forms of employee religious
expression in the workplace," there appears to be some hope that prison
workers will have a fighting chance 9 in overcoming the security
concerns that have effectively neutralized recent expression claims.20 As
such, this Note seeks to argue that, if the WRFA becomes law, courts
must engage in a far more critical and probing examination of the
security concerns proffered by prison facilities for the sake of the
religious liberty interests of prison employees. Specifically, this Note
maintains that courts should more actively address the clear instances
where prison officials offer security concerns related to employee "garb
,,21I 22
and grooming" that appear either tenuous or unfounded. This position
reflects the idea that, while safety is an understandable and justifiable
primary consideration in the nation's prisons, the inherent value of the
religious expression rights of prison employees demands that prisons
23
offer legitimate foundations for stated security concerns. For these
reasons, courts should interpret the WRFA and the heightened standard it
advances as a basis for ensuring that prison policies serve legitimate
17. H.R. 1431.
18. Giles Roblyer, Half-Answered Prayers: Sturgill v. United Parcel Service,
512 F.3d 1024 (8th Cir. 2008), 77 U. CIN. L. REv. 1683, 1703 (2009).
19. See Foltin, supra note 1, at 71 (stating that the WRFA will help protect
religious freedom, especially that of minority groups, by urging courts to view "the
religious accommodation provision of Title VII in a fashion consistent with other
protections against discrimination to be found elsewhere in this nation's civil-rights
laws").
20. See E.E.O.C. v. GEO Group, Inc., 616 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2010); see also
Booth v. Maryland, 327 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 2003).
21. Charles C. Haynes, Religion in the Workplace: Keep Your Faith, Lose
Your Job, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, Sept. 21, 2003,
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/commentary.aspx?id= 11948.
22. See GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 285 (Tashima, J., dissenting) (stating that the
majority's opinion "in effect, establishes a per se rule that when an employer asserts
that its rationale for denying a religious accommodation is safety, the employer need
not adduce any evidence to prove the existence of, let alone the magnitude of, the
burden it would suffer by accommodating the religious practice").
23. See id. at 277 (Tashima, J., dissenting) ("The majority, thus, effectively
relieves GEO, as the employer and moving party asserting safety concerns, of the
burden of proving the existence of the asserted safety concerns, as well as of the fact
and magnitude of the asserted hardship in accommodating plaintiffs religious
needs.").
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security interests, that security concerns are more effectively balanced
with the religious expression rights of prison employees, and that the
apparent disparity in religious expression protections offered to prisoners
versus prison employees is minimized.24
I. BACKGROUND ON THE NEED, PURPOSE, AND RENEWED
CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST IN THE WORKPLACE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
ACT (WRFA)
The Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2007 (WRFA), 25 a
piece of proposed legislation that aims to bolster protections for religious
26expression in the workplace, has received ongoing consideration from
27
Congress for well over a decade. In general, the WRFA was originally
created with the goal of amending Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
24. This divide appears to have resulted, at least in part, from the passage and
effect of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-i et seq. (2006). See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S.
709, 721 (2005) ("RLUIPA thus protects institutionalized persons who are unable
freely to attend to their religious needs and are therefore dependent on the
government's permission and accommodation for exercise of their religion."); see
also GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 288 (Tashima, J., dissenting) (implying that sacrificing
certain religious garb choices of employees for the sake of safety concerns seems
nonsensical when the permitted clothing choices of prisoners appear to pose a
substantial threat to safety); discussion infra Part Ill (discussing the disparity in
treatment of prisoners versus prison employees).
25. H.R. 1431, 110th Cong. (2007). There was also a similar, but more
targeted bill in the Senate in 2008. S. 3628, 110th Cong. (2008). This bill was
reintroduced in 2010. S. 4046, 111th Cong. (2010).
26. See K. Hollyn Hollman, Holloman Report: Where is the Workplace
Religious Freedom Act?, REPORT FROM THE CAPITAL (Baptist Joint Committee for
Religious Liberty, Washington, D.C.), Apr. 2008, at 7, available at
http://www.bjconline.org/index2.php?option=comdocman&task=doc view&gid=8
3&Itemid=76 (contending that the WRFA "would put some teeth into the
requirement that employers reasonably accommodate an employee's religious
observances").
27. See Robert A. Caplen, A Struggle of Biblical Proportions: The Campaign
to Enact the Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2003, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 579, 600-03 (2005); see also James A. Sonne, The Perils of Universal
Accommodation: The Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2003 and The
Affirmative Action of 147,096,000 Souls, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1023, 1025 n.10
(2004) (citing versions of the WRFA that were previously proposed by Congress
between 1994 and 2002).
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196428 in a manner that would offer employees greater freedoms to
29
express their faith in the workplace. Specifically, Title VII "prohibits
employers from discharging or disciplining an employee based on his or
her religion." 30 Despite the apparent legal protection this language
affords employees, Title VII is limited in a notable manner, which has
helped to underscore the need for congressional legislative action
32through the WRFA. Title VII maintains that an employer is not bound
by the dictates of its language if the employer "is unable to reasonably
accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer's business." 3 3 Given these terms, the United States Supreme
Court has suggested that "[a]n accommodation constitutes an 'undue
hardship' if it would impose more than a de minimis cost on the
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006). While the WRFA was an amendment to Title
VII, Senator Kerry has indicated that the proposed legislation functioned as a type of
"restoration" of the "original intent" of the 1972 Congress in amending the Civil
Rights Act of 1972. 145 CONG. REC. S11, 647 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1999) (statement
of Sen. Kerry). Senator Kerry has stated:
This 1972 amendment, although completely appropriate, has
been interpreted by the courts so narrowly as to place little
restraint on an employer's refusal to provide religious
accommodation. The Workplace Religious Freedom Act will
restore to the religious accommodation provision the weight
that Congress originally intended and help assure that
employers have a meaningful obligation to reasonably
accommodate their employees' religious practices.
Id.
29. See THE WORKPLACE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT: BACKGROUNDER, INST.
FOR PUB. AFF.: IPA PUB. POL'Y LIBR., http://www.ou.org/public/statements
/bg/wrfa.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2011) [hereinafter BACKGROUNDER]; see also
Sonne, supra note 27, at 1049-51 (presenting certain features of the WRFA's
background and core terms, a discussion of its objectives, and comparison between
the WRFA and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990).
30. Webb v. Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256, 259 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a)(1)).
31. BACKGROUNDER, supra note 29. See also Sonne, supra note 27, at 1025-26
(highlighting this Title VII exception and introducing the WRFA's proffered
solution to it).
32. See BACKGROUNDER, supra note 29 (highlighting, generally, the
limitations of Title VII and the WRFA's potential impact in ameliorating such
limitations).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
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employer." 34 Such a standard is problematic given the fact that it seems
to be 'not a difficult threshold to pass."' 35 Consequently, some
employee-plaintiffs have seen their claims surrounding the right to freely
observe and express their faith in the workplace struck down by federal
courts.36
Although the above trend has served to represent, in relative
terms, the legal reality surrounding religion and the workplace over the
last few decades, the WRFA has been considered by Republican and
Democratic members of Congress as a means of upholding the
fundamental constitutional ideal of religious freedom in a reasonable
manner in the employment arena. 3 9 This perspective has persisted despite
the reality that the WRFA has remained a proposed law since the early to
34. Webb, 562 F.3d at 259-60 (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977)).
35. Id. at 260 (quoting United States v. Bd. of Educ., 911 F.2d 882, 890 (3d
Cir. 1990)).
36. See, e.g., id. at 258 (holding that police officer's request to wear a
"headscarf' during the course of her employment would impose an "undue burden"
on the city in question); Wilson v. U.S. W. Commc'ns, 58 F.3d 1337, 1342 (8th Cir.
1995) (affirming the denial of worker's Title VII claim against employer for being
terminated after failing to remove a religiously motivated anti-abortion pin while she
was in the workplace). This trend is significant given that "[b]ased on figures
released by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the number of claims
of religious discrimination in the workplace filed for the fiscal year ending on
September 30, 2006, as compared to the fiscal year ending on September 30, 1992,
reflect a startling increase of over 75 percent." Foltin, supra note 1, at 68.
37. See Foltin, supra note 1, at 67-68 (implying that the Civil Rights Act, since
1972, has fallen short in offering adequate religious expression protections); see also
Caplen, supra note 27, at 588-600 (discussing, generally, the legal standard of Title
VII as applied to religious accommodation in the workplace since the late 1970s).
38. Hollman, supra note 26, at 6.
39. See Sen. Rick Santorum & Sen. John Kerry, Op-Ed, Religion in the
Pharmacy, N.Y. TIMES, April 12, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005
/04/12/opinion/ll2kerry.html [hereinafter Santorum & Kerry] (writing that WRFA,
in at least one context, "provides a sensible solution to the potential conflict between
an employee's religious conviction and the needs of pharmacy customers"); see also
145 CONG. REC. Sll, 647 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1999) (statement of Sen. Kerry) ("The
restoration of this protection is no small matter. For many religiously observant
Americans the greatest peril to their ability to carry out their religious faiths on a
day-to-day basis may come from employers.").
middle part of the 1990s 40 and its coalition of supporters has undergone
certain changes in composition in recent years.41 Such alterations have
been, at least to some degree, a product of Senator John F. Kerry's (D-
Ma.) 2008 introduction before the United States Senate 42 of what is
considered a "targeted" version of the WRFA.43 Specifically, this version
of the WRFA "identifies two practices - wearing religious clothing or
hairstyles, and taking time off for a religious reason - as ones that will
amount to undue hardship only if they impose significant difficulty or
expense" on the employer.4 While previous versions of the proposed
legislation have also advanced the "significant difficulty or expense"
interpretation of undue hardship,45 the 2007 House version of the WRFA
is more comprehensive46 than its 2008 counterpart in that it includes the
"stipulation that 'to be considered to be reasonable, [an] accommodation
shall remove the conflict between employment requirements and the
religious observance or practice of the employee."' 4 7 Such language is
40. Caplen, supra note 27, at 600-01; see also Workplace Religious Freedom
Act of 1994, H.R. 5233, 103rd Cong. (1992-93) (marking the first introduction of
the proposed legislation).
41. Interview with James Gibson, Staff Counsel, Baptist Joint Committee for
Religious Liberty, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 31, 2011) (notes on file with author)
[hereinafter Gibson Interview] (noting that, following Senator Kerry's introduction
of the 2008 version of the WRFA, coalition composition began to shift); see also
Hollman, supra note 26, at 6 ("Negotiations in recent weeks demonstrate that such
legislative efforts require a painstaking process of listening, drafting, responding, re-
drafting and determining what compromises can be made without giving up the bulk
of what was intended in the first place.").
42. S. 3628, 110th Cong. (2008).
43. See Gibson Interview, supra note 41; Foltin, supra note 1, at 74. ("It has
been suggested that the way to deal with these concerns is to resort to a so-called
'targeted' approach, under which Congress would single out particular religious
practices - dress, grooming, holy days - for protection under the WRFA
standard.").
44. See Futrell, supra note 16, at 419; S. 3628 § 2(a)(2), 110th Cong. (2008).
45. See, e.g., Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2007, H.R. 1431, 110th
Cong., § 2(a)(4) (2007) (proposing the addition of language clarifiying that undue
hardship "means an accommodation requiring significant difficulty or expense").
46. With the introduction of Senator Kerry's targeted version of WRFA in
2008, the 2007 version is often referred to as the comprehensive version of WRFA
due to its more expansive language. Gibson Interview, supra note 41.
47. See Futrell, supra note 16, at 419 (quoting H.R. 1431, 110th Cong., §
2(b)(2) (2007)).
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suggestive of more sweeping protections for the religious expression of
employees in the workplace,48 and its removal in the 2008 version
indicates Congress' attempts to tailor the proposed Act in a manner that
49
would result in its eventual passage.
Even with the change in language of the proposed legislation, for
the purposes of the arguments advanced in this Note, the 2007 and 2008
versions of the WRFA present similar concerns regarding potential
religious expression protections afforded to prison workers. The central
and consistent thrust of the WRFA is to ensure employers allow for more
significant accommodation of the religious practices of employees during
the course of their employment. In particular, while the 2007 version of
the WRFA and its potential impact are discussed below, 5 both the 2007
and 2008 versions of the proposed Act include general protections for the
garb and grooming practices52 of employees and reinterpret "'undue
48. Gibson Interview, supra note 41.
49. Id. (highlighting that the comprehensive versions of WRFA failed to
become law under Congresses and Presidents of variant political compositions since
its original introduction in the early- to mid-1990s and that the targeted version seeks
to increase the likelihood of enactment).
50. See Foltin, supra note 1, at 71; Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2008,
S. 3628, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. 1431, 110th Cong. (2007).
51. Due to the similarities between these versions of the WRFA and the fact
that it remains unclear which version could eventually become law, for the purposes
of this Note, the citations below regarding support for and criticism of the WRFA
pertain to the 2007 version. H.R. 1431, 110th Cong. (2007).
52. These specific areas of protection are particularly salient because they
appear to provide some significant grounds for conflict between employers and
employees. See E.E.O.C. v. GEO Group, Inc., 616 F.3d 265-66, 274 (3d Cir. 2010)
(holding that a private employer did not, under the dictates of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, have to allow female workers to wear Muslim headscarves
during the course of employment at a prison because of general safety issues); Booth
v. Maryland, 327 F.3d 377-78, 383 (4th Cir. 2003) (implying judicial acceptance of
the security concerns inherent in a prison's adherence to a grooming policy that
resulted in prohibiting a prison worker from wearing religiously-motivated
dreadlocks in the workplace). See also James M. Oleske, Federalism, Free Exercise,
and Title VII: Reconsidering Reasonable Accommodation, 6 U. PA. 3. CONST. L. 525,
533-36 (2004) (alluding to an apparent trend in how some lower courts view certain
employment guidelines as to, inter alia, religious garb and grooming practices of
employees).
53. See Gibson Interview, supra note 41; Foltin, supra note 1, at 71 ("WRFA
would also make clear that the employer has an affirmative and ongoing obligation
to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious practice and observance.").
758 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 9
hardship' as an accommodation 'requiring significant difficulty or
expense."' 5 4 Given that this specific elevated standard embodies a
proposed change and not a present reality, it remains unclear how courts
will interpret and apply this standard if either version of the WRFA
becomes law.55 However, supporters of the WRFA and its heightened
standard have suggested that the level of protections offered to
employees could be substantial. 6 As one of the WRFA's main
proponents has claimed, the WRFA will help protect religious freedom
by urging courts to view "the religious accommodation provision of Title
VII in a fashion consistent with other protections against discrimination
to be found elsewhere in this nation's civil-rights laws."57 Another
commentator has echoed these sentiments, stating, "Once enacted, the
WRFA will represent 'another milestone in civil rights."' 58 In light of
these perspectives, the WRFA could allow employees to have the
opportunity in the workplace to at least maintain garb and grooming
practices inherent in their faiths because the proposed Act would
Compare S. 3628, 110th Cong. § 2 (2008) (including explicit language protecting
garb and grooming practices) with H.R. 1431, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) (using broader
language which can be construed as covering these religious observances).
54. Futrell, supra note 16, at 408 (quoting H.R. 1431, 110th Cong., § 2(a)(3)
(2007)). See also S. 3628, 110th Cong. (2008) (defining "undue hardship").
55. See Lauren E. Bohn, Workplace Religious Freedom Bill Finds Revived
Interest, RELIGION NEWS SERVICE, May 3, 2010, available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/03/workplace-religious-
freed n_561560.html (suggesting that there is uncertainty regarding how the
heightened standard of the WRFA will be applied and what its impact will be if
passed by Congress).
56. See Foltin, supra note 1, at 76 (arguing, in reference to the 2007 version of
the proposed legislation, that "[e]nactment of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act
will constitute an important step towards ensuring that all members of society,
whatever their religious beliefs and practices, will be protected from an invidious
form of discrimination"); see also 145 CONG. REC. S11, 647 (daily ed. Sept. 29,
1999) (statement of Sen. Kerry) (explaining that "[t]he restoration of this protection
is no small matter. For many religiously observant Americans the greatest peril to
their ability to carry out their religious faiths on a day-to-day basis may come from
employers.").
57. Foltin, supra note 1, at 71.
58. Caplen, supra note 27, at 624 (quoting Richard T. Foltin & James D.
Standish, Reconciling Faith and Livelihood: Religion in the Workplace and Title VII,
31 HUM. RTS. 19, 24 (Summer 2004)).
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strengthen the relatively feeble interpretation of undue hardship
maintained by the United States Supreme Court.5 9
However, despite the potentially significant protections that the
WRFA aims to offer and the fact that supporters of the proposed
60
legislation hail from a range of groups, the WRFA has not been without
detractors. It appears that, in particular, a "set of concerns has been
raised that implementation of WRFA will lead to material adverse
impacts on third parties." 62 One prominent group, for example, has
emphasized in the past that the apparent thrust of the WRFA could
enable employees to essentially use their religious beliefs as
justifications for not interacting with certain individuals based on race,
religion, sexual orientation, or other traits and characteristics.63 This
particular area of opposition can apparently be narrowed further, as it
essentially surrounds "two types of hypothetical situations - that
WRFA will be used to protect those who would cite religious beliefs as a
59. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977)
(establishing the "de minimis" cost consideration associated with the undue hardship
standard); see also Bilal Zaheer, Note, Accommodating Minority Religions Under
Title VII: How Muslims Make the Case for a New Interpretation of 701(), 2007 U.
ILL. L. REv. 497, 510-13 (2007) (providing a general background discussion on the
Supreme Court's approach to Title VII as shown through relevant case law).
60. Hollman, supra note 26, at 6 (contending that as of 2008, "the WRFA
coalition continues to include a broad array of supporters").
61. See, e.g., Futrell, supra note 16, at 373, 375 (arguing that "the language of
the WRFA ensures inevitable excessive entanglement of government and religion in
the context of public employers and religious employees"); Sonne, supra note 27, at
1024 ("[T]he Act maintains an inappropriate conception of religion and its practice
that results in employer burdens without precedent in employment or constitutional
law."); Gregory M. Baxter, Employers Beware: The Workplace Religious Freedom
Act Of 2000, 2 RUTGERS J. LAW & RELIG. 6, 26-27 (2000) (presenting the potential
negative impact of congressional enactment of the WRFA).
62. Foltin, supra note 1, at 72.
63. Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Director, ACLU & Christopher E. Anders,
Legislative Counsel, ACLU, to unnamed Senators on the Harmful Effect of S. 893,
the Workplace Religious Freedom Act, on Critical Personal and Civil Rights (June 2,
2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/religion-belief/aclu-letter-harmful-effect-s-
893-workplace-religious-freedom-act-critical-personal-a. It must be noted that the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) raised this specific point of opposition in
relation to the more comprehensive version of the WRFA that predated Senator
Kerry's "targeted" version before the Senate in 2008. Gibson Interview, supra note
41. The ACLU now supports the "targeted" version of the WRFA. Id.
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justification for harassing gays in the workplace, and that WRFA will be
used to limit access to reproductive healthcare."64 Similarly, for other
detractors, the WRFA's requirements have the potential to place too
61 66
great a burden on a protected employee's coworkers and employer.
This concern is reflected in the opinion of one commentator who
maintains that "the Act would substantially enlarge the duty of
employers to accommodate their religious employees, which would
impose greater demands on coworkers to acquiesce to religious
accommodation requests." 67 Based on this specific criticism, it is
accurate to maintain that some opponents of the WRFA perceive the
protections it seeks to offer as outweighed by the suspected economic
realities of its enactment.68
Proponents of the WRFA have responded to the above criticisms
69by implying that such concerns are largely misplaced and misguided.
As one group of supporters has suggested, the WRFA will not make it
easier for employees to infringe on the rights of other individuals during
their employment because of embedded provisions in the proposed law
precluding such outcomes.7 0 Particularly, as the latter group has
emphasized, "WRFA's requirement that an accommodation only be
64. Foltin, supra note 1, at 72.
65. See Mark A. Kellner, House Panel Hears Adventist, others on Sabbath
Protection, ADVENTIST REV., Feb. 7, 2008, http://www.adventistreview.org
/article.php?id=1674.
66. See Bohn, supra note 55 (stating, in reference to concerns over past
versions of WFRA, that "[t]he ACLU and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce were
concerned other employees might be forced to carry additional workloads to
accommodate co-workers, and that it would allow religious viewpoints to interfere
with a secular workplace").
67. Baxter, supra note 61, at 30.
68. Sonne, supra note 27, at 1023-24 (demonstrating, by way of a
hypothetical, the types of potential financial and other types of burdens that the
WRFA may impose upon employers).
69. See, e.g., Kellner, supra note 65 ("WRFA provides a modest level of
protection to ensure that American workers are no longer arbitrarily forced to choose
between their faith and their livelihood."); Workplace Religious Freedom Act (S.
677; H.R. 1445), Some Questions and Answers, INST. FOR PUB. AFF., (Jan. 3, 2007)
http://www.ou.org/public affairs/article/workplace religious freedomact somequ
estions and answers [hereinafter Questions and Answers] (suggesting that concerns
surrounding protected workers burdening third parties are unfounded under WRFA).
70. See Questions andAnswers, supra note 69.
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granted when it will not impose a significant difficulty or expense on the
employer ensures that employers must be able to deliver their services
and products to their customers and clients."n In essence, such a position
seems to suggest that, while the WRFA seeks to promote the view "that
the employer has an affirmative and ongoing obligation to reasonably
accommodate an employee's religious practice and observance," 7 2 this
responsibility does not have to be pursued at the complete detriment of
the employer.73 Such an outcome is possible under the WRFA because
the proposed Act's amended interpretation of Title VII's undue hardship
provision suggests that the extent of accommodation required will be
judicially reviewed and evaluated in a manner that is "context
specific." 74 Thus, some proponents of the WRFA refute the claim that
employers will bear too great of a burden in accommodating the religious
practices of their employees under the proposed Act by highlighting that
courts will be able to examine the specific facts of each accommodation
- 75if necessary.
Apart from the judicial means through which accommodation
concerns may be addressed under the WRFA, some of its supporters
imply that any difficulties that may be produced by its requirements will
likely solve themselves in an almost organic manner as opposed to in the
76courts. This perspective is illustrated in how one particular group
71. See id.
72. Foltin, supra note 1, at 71.
73. See id.
74. Questions and Answers, supra note 69. See also Foltin, supra note 1, at 72.
As Foltin explainined:
A central component of WRFA, as is the case under current
accommodation law, is its balancing test, albeit with a
modification of the operative definitions of 'reasonable
accommodation' and 'undue hardship.' Nothing in that
change in definition will alter the fact that courts are quick
to recognize that workplace harassment imposes a
significant hardship on employers in various ways ....
Id.
75. See Foltin, supra note 1, at 72 (stating that "the threshold question of
sincerity as to religious belief must be resolved as a question of fact"); see also
Caplen, supra note 27, at 623 (arguing that the WRFA will afford "an appropriate
balance between protecting religious liberty and reconciling faith within the
workplace").
76. See Questions andAnswers, supra note 69.
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envisions a specific practical effect of the WRFA in the workplace and
on employee-employer interaction.7 7 The group has maintained:
A typical scenario which the passage of WRFA
would address is with regard to permitting the more
flexible work schedules religious employees often
need. If, for example, an employee needed to leave
early on Friday afternoon in order to observe the
Jewish sabbath [sic] or a Christian wished to take
off from work on Good Friday, and was willing to
work late nights earlier in the week to ensure that
all of the tasks for which he/she was responsible
were completed (ensuring that there would be no
impact upon the employer's 'bottom line'), WRFA
would require the employer to grant such an
accommodation and not insist that worker be
78
present on Friday.
Overall, it appears fair to assert that this envisioned scenario in
the workplace is premised on the view that the WRFA will encourage the
employee and the employer to interact in a manner that is not only
"reasonable" 79 but reflective of the types of workplace accommodation
Congress aimed to create in the past through Title VII. As such, under
the proposed Act, the employer, and it appears the employee as well,
will "bear the responsibility of making actual, palpable efforts to arrive at
an accommodation." 82
Coupled with these defenses of the WRFA, some backers also
contend that the proposed legislation "will [not] somehow empower
employees to act in ways that hurt others in the workplace or cause third
77. See BACKGROUNDER, supra note 29.
7 8. Id.
79. See Foltin, supra note 1, at 76.
80. See Caplen, supra note 27, at 584-85; see also Foltin, supra note 1, at 76
(stating that in order to "assur[e] that employers have a meaningful obligation to
reasonably accommodate their employees' religious practices, WFRA will restore to
Title VIl's religious-accommodation provision the weight that Congress originally
intended").
81. See Questions and Answers, supra note 69 (noting that employees will not
be able to demand any accommodation they please).
82. Richard T. Foltin & James D. Standish, Reconciling Faith and Livelihood
Religion in the Workplace and Title VII, 31 HuM. RTS. 19, 24 (Summer 2004).
762 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9
SEARCHING FOR SECURITY
parties to be denied needed services."83 As a basis for this assertion,
some point to the fact that harassment law has mechanisms in place that
actively preclude an employee from criticizing or distracting a coworker
or a third party in an impermissible manner based on religious beliefs or
observance.84 Furthermore, as other supporters argue, the language and
overall spirit of the Act provide coworkers and third parties the needed
protections from unwanted harassment or refusals of service by an
81
employee based on religious beliefs. Specifically, as one group has
maintained, "WRFA's requirement that an employee cannot receive an
accommodation which interferes with the performance of a job's
'essential functions' also protects third parties against adverse affects
[sic], especially in the health services context." 86 In other words, all that
the WRFA requires in a situation in which an employer must decide
whether to allow an employee to refuse services to a customer or patient
based on religious observance is if the refusal presents "a palpable
significant difficulty or expense" to the employer. Consequently, it
would seem that the employee remains accountable under the language
of the WRFA for actions that exceed the latter standard in interactions
with third parties in the workplace.
Given these overall arguments, one would be remiss not to
mention one of the central and growing foundations upon which some
proponents of the WIRFA appear to partially base their arguments in
favor of stronger legal protections for religious expression in the
workplace.89 Specifically, the nation has experienced a growth in
83. Id. at 24.
84. Id at 19.
85. See Questions and Answers, supra note 69.
86. Id.
87. Foltin, supra note 1, at 73.
88. See Questions and Answers, supra note 69 (stating that the WRFA will not
interfere with civil rights or health services of third parties); see also Caplen, supra
note 27, at 616-21 (disputing the concerns of the WRFA opponents regarding the
potential extent of employee protections in the healthcare arena by highlighting
judicial treatment of the issue under Title VII).
89. See Foltin, supra note 1, at 68 (asserting that one indication for the need
for the WRFA is demonstrated through "our nation's increasing diversity, marked by
a broad spectrum of religious traditions, some of which may clash with workplace
parameters that do not take into account the religious observances of immigrant
communities. . .").
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religious pluralism 90 and an increase in the presence of individuals from
a range of faiths in disparate areas of employment. 91 "In fact the
American Religious Identification Survey 2001 (ARIS) noted the portion
of the American adult population classifying itself as Christian declined
from 86% to 77% between 1990 and 2001." 92 Another survey seems to
have indirectly confirmed the latter findings, 93 stating, "[m]embers of
Protestant churches now constitute only a slim majority (51.3%) of the
overall adult population." 9 4 Furthermore, the size of some of the
populations of those adhering to faiths other than Christianity has more
than doubled since the decade before and at the turn of the 21st century.9 5
In essence, based on such overall findings, it seems fair to contend that
the American workplace is becoming increasingly heterogeneous in
terms of represented faiths. 96
The aforementioned perspectives are clearly substantial in
considering the potential significance of the WRFA's protections given
that an increasing sense of religious diversity in the workplace naturally
creates a need for ensuring that employers will reasonably adjust the
work environment to appropriately accommodate the religious beliefs of
employees. 97 Such adjustment could continue to prove difficult for
employers98 based on the reality that many may be effectively acclimated
"to accommodating only traditional Christian workers' requests" 99 rather
90. See Foltin, supra note 1, at 68.
91. See Garry Rollins, Religious Expression in the Growing Multicultural
Workplace, 2 J. DIVERSITY MGMT. 1, 3 (2007), available at
http://www.cluteinstitute-onlinejournals.com/PDFs/2007174.pdf (providing a table
of data demonstrating the rise in the number of individuals participating in various
faiths in the nation in relatively recent years).
92. Id. at 2.
93. See THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS
LANDSCAPE SURVEY 10 (Feb. 2008), available at http://religions.pewforum.org
/pdf/report-religious-landscape-study-full.pdf (finding that 78.4% of adults in the
United States classify themselves as Christian).
94. Id.
95. See Rollins, supra note 91, at 3.
96. Id.
97. See Foltin, supra note 1, at 68.




than those raised by members of other faiths.'00 To complicate matters of
accommodation in the American workplace further, tensions between
certain religious groups in "the post-September 1Ith world",o' have
raised concerns that discrimination of employees based on faith has
become an ever-present reality.102 As one leading proponent of the
WRFA highlighted, there was and has been "latent animosity toward
some religious traditions after the September 11 attacks, a phenomenon
evidenced by a particularly severe spike in religious claims after the
attacks, when Sikh and Muslim Americans faced greater hostility at
work."' 0 3 In fact, the current number of complaints of workplace
discrimination that have been filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission by Muslims, in particular, 104 "exceeds even the
amount filed in the year after the 9/11 terrorist attacks." 0 5 Based on such
a reality, and the overall growth in national religious pluralism, it seems
fair to maintain that the WRFA is needed to ensure workplace
protections in today's society more than ever.'o0
II. CASE LAW DEMONSTRATIVE OF THE NEED FOR THE WRFA OR
WRFA-LIKE PROTECTIONS FOR THE RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION OF
PRISON EMPLOYEES
Despite the growing need for religious protections in the
workplace and the potential coverage offered by the WRFA discussed
above, the proposed legislation appears to have the potential of failing to
100. See id., at 2; see also Zaheer, supra note 59, at 497-98 (underscoring the
fact that increased religious diversity poses accommodation issues in employment
situations).
101. Zaheer, supra note 59, at 497.
102. See Rollins, supra note 91, at 2
103. Foltin, supra note 1, at 68.
104. See Steven Greenhouse, Offended Muslims Speak Up, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
24, 2010, at Bl, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/24/business/24muslim.html.
105. Id.
106. See Foltin, supra note 1, at 68. ("Based on figures released by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, the number of claims of religious
discrimination in the workplace filed for the fiscal year ending on September 30,
2006, as compared to the fiscal year ending on September 30, 1992, reflect a
startling increase of over 75 percent.").
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offer a particular group of workers sufficient and warranted workplace
coverage.107 Specifically, recent court decisions restricting the religious
expression of prison workers while on the job have underscored the fact
that safety concerns can effectively trump the freedom of religious
expression of these specific employees,ios especially under the weak
undue hardship standard associated with Title VII.' 09 As highlighted by
the decisions issued by federal courts in E.E.O.C. v. GEO Group, Inc.110
and Booth v. Maryland," I prison workers have been exposed to the
apparent tension in the law between the desire to reasonably
accommodate the religious practices of these employees and the need to
maintain safety and consistency in the workplace.112 While safety goals
are certainly justifiable and important within a prison, such concerns
seem misguided as they relate to the religiously-motivated clothing and
107. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. GEO Group, Inc., 616 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2010)
(holding that a private employer did not, under the dictates of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, have to allow female workers to wear Muslim headscarves
during the course of employment at a prison because of general safety issues); Booth
v. Maryland, 327 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 2003) (implying judicial acceptance of the
security concerns inherent in a prison's adherence to a grooming policy that resulted
in prohibiting a prison worker from wearing religiously-motivated dreadlocks in the
workplace).
108. See GEO Group, 616 F.3d 265; Booth, 327 F.3d 377.
109. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006); GEO Group, 616 F.3d 265.
110. 616 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2010).
111. 327 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 2003).
112. See, e.g., GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 275.
The EEOC has an enviable history of taking steps to enforce
the prohibition against religious discrimination in many forms
and its sincerity in support of its arguments against the
application of the no headgear policy to Muslim employees
wearing khimars is evident. On the other hand, the prison has
an overriding responsibility to ensure the safety of its
prisoners, its staff, and the visitors. A prison is not a summer
camp and prison officials have the unenviable task of
preserving order in difficult circumstances.
Id.
113. See Taylor G. Stout, Note, The Costs of Religious Accommodation in
Prisons, 96 VA. L. REv. 1201, 1208-13 (2010) (presenting general security issues
faced in prisons as they relate to RLUIPA).
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hairstyles of prison workers.1 4 This claim, surrounding the arguable
over-emphasis on security concerns in prisons in this specific area, is
rooted in the United States' long recognition of the intrinsic worth of
religious freedomm as reflected in the overall spirit of the First
Amendment. " Denying prison workers the opportunity to express
themselves in the workplace appears inherently incompatible with the
latter historical and legal tradition. This position is magnified further in
that certain courts do not seem to rely on or require clear facts to support
claims that the religious garb or grooming practices of prison workers
disrupt the overall safety of prison facilities.117 Consequently, prisoners
appear to receive greater protections for their religious garb and
114. See GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 277 (Tashima, J., dissenting) ("The
majority, thus, effectively relieves GEO, as the employer and moving party asserting
safety concerns, of the burden of proving the existence of the asserted safety
concerns, as well as of the fact and magnitude of the asserted hardship in
accommodating plaintiffs religious needs.").
115. See Chris Markos, Note, Empty Threats and Saber Rattling: Why the
International Religious Freedom Act Provides a Better Solution to Combating
Terrorism and Promoting Stability in Pakistan, 11 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION. 177,
178-79 (2009) (implying that America's historical commitment to religious freedom
is the basis for and, to some extent, reflected in the nation's commitment to this ideal
internationally).
116. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) ("The essence of
all that has been said and written on the subject is that only those interests of the
highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to
the free exercise of religion.").
117. See, e.g., GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 274-77 (relying on broad assertions of
safety concerns in affirming summary judgment in favor of defendants); Booth v.
Maryland, 327 F.3d 377, 381 (4th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that the generalized
security issues cited by defendants were sufficient in overcoming the plaintiffs
claims).
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grooming practices than prison workers,"1 8 despite safety concerns
surrounding general prisoner religious accommodation.119
The noted inconsistencies between accommodating religious
expression in America and sacrificing such a pursuit for prison workers
for the sake of vague safety concernsl20 is relevant to the WRFA because
it highlights a significant challenge that will apparently remain for courts
if the WRFA is passed.121 Essentially, courts will have to decide whether
the heightened standard of "significant difficulty" that the WRFA seeks
to place on employersl22 effectively protects the freedom of prison
employees to wear certain religiously-motivated clothing, hairstyles, and
facial hair while on the job. In other words, courts will have to confront
the issue of whether this new standard is or is not overcome by the type
of safety concerns that have proven to cause such religious expression
claims to fail in the recent past.123 While such a task will likely prove
challenging for courts in light of a strong emphasis in the law "that
118. This position finds support through the language of RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000cc-l(a)(1), (2) (2006), which maintains that "'[n]o government shall impose
a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to
an institution,' unless the burden furthers 'a compelling governmental interest,' and
does so by 'the least restrictive means."' Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 712
(2005) (quoting RLUIPA). Further background material surrounding RLUIPA and
its potential to help guide the enactment of the WRFA so as to more adequately
protect the religious expression rights of prison employees in the workplace are
discussed later in this Note. See discussion infra Part 111.
119. See Aaron K. Block, Note, When Money is Tight, is Strict Scrutiny
Loose?: Cost Sensitivity as a Compelling Governmental Interest Under the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 14 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 237, 238
(2009) (highlighting overall congressional and administrative concerns regarding
RLUIPA protections and resultant security issues).
120. See GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 277-78 (Tashima, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that a reasonable jury could find that the ambiguous security concerns of prison
officials should not be enough to overcome the strong interests the specific prison
employees at issue had in religious expression through clothing choices).
121. See, e.g., id. at 274-77 (relying on broad assertions of safety concerns in
affirming summary judgment in favor of defendants); Booth, 327 F.3d at 381
(suggesting that the generalized security issues cited by defendants were sufficient in
meeting low standard applicable to case).
122. H.R. 1431, 110th Cong. § 2(a)(4) (2007).
123. See, e.g., GEO Group, 616 F.3d 265 (holding that a private employer did
not, under the dictates of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, have to allow
female workers to wear Muslim headscarves during the course of employment at a
prison because of general safety issues).
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prisons have compelling interests in maintaining institutional security
and disciplining offenders," 24 the heightened standard the WRFA
advances suggests that security concerns in prisons can and should be
overcome in situations where the employee's rights of expression are
particularly compelling.125
Thus, given the substantial weight that the WRFA appears to
place on accommodating the religious practices of employees when
feasible, it is submitted here that, if the WRFA is passed by Congress,
courts must not merely accept "'conclusory statements and post hoc
rationalizations"' from prison officials regarding safety concerns.126
Instead, courts should apply the WRFA's proposed heightened standard
in accommodating the workplace religious expression of prison
employees in the "appropriately balanced way."1 2 7 This balancing could
entail case-by-case analysis of the manner in which a given prison
employee chose to express his or her faith through garb or grooming and
the degree to which such a manifestation of belief created or did not
create a truly legitimate security concern. 128 While certainly inclusive of
a "sensitivity to security concerns" in prisons,12 9 such an approach would
ideally encourage courts to be more measured and cautious in potentially
sacrificing a prison employee's rights of religious expression in the
workplace.130 Hence, if the WRFA becomes law and its "significant
difficulty" standard is formally required of employers, courts should
interpret the Act as dictating that proffered safety concerns in prisons
124. Joseph E. Bredehoft, Note, Religious Expression and the Penal
Institution: The Role ofDamages in RLUIPA Enforcement, 74 MO. L. REV. 153, 157
(2009) (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722-23 (2005)).
125. See GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 277-78 (Tashima, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that a reasonable jury could find that the vague security concerns of prison officials
should not be enough to overcome the strong interests the specific prison employees
at issue had in religious expression through clothing choices).
126. Murphy v. Mo. Dept. of Correction, 372 F.3d 979, 989 (8th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1554 (8th Cir. 1996)).
127. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005).
128. See GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 284-90 (Tashima, J., dissenting) (implying
through the facts of the case that there was a need to examine both of the proffered
security interests in light of apparently significant religious expression interests of
the employees).
129. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722.
130. See GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 288-89 (Tashima, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that the majority too readily accepted vague security interests of the prison).
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must be sufficiently convincing to overcome prison workers'
constitutionally-based rights of religious expression in the work
environment.'3 1
The need for a more balanced and accommodating approach to
the religious expression of prison workers during the course of their
employment has been clearly highlighted by two circuit court cases:
E.E.O.C. v. GEO Group, Inc.132 and Booth v. Maryland.133 The cases,
one which specifically centered on prison prohibitions against employees
wearing certain religious garb 34 and the other involving an officer's
violation of prison grooming policies, 135 underscore the degree of
deference some courts have granted prison officials in their assertions
that certain religious expression in the workplace poses security issues.136
In examining both the facts and reasoning in each of the cases, it is clear
that certain courts consider the present undue hardship test advanced by
Title VII as a relatively easy bar for prison officials to overcome. 137 As
argued throughout this Note, that fact appears to disregard American
society's longstanding emphasis on the fundamental freedom of religious
expression amongst the nation's citizenry.' 3 8 These cases provide prime
examples of how the heightened standard advanced by the WRFA can
131. See id. at 286-89 (implying that the prison employees made enough of a
showing of religious expression interests to overcome safety concerns alleged under
Title VII).
132. 616 F.3d 265.
133. 327 F.3d 377 (2003).
134. GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 267.
135. See Booth, 327 F.3d at 379.
136. See GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 273-77 (ruling that a prison official's
particular safety concerns with respect to head coverings, though potentially based in
speculation, were sufficient to meet the undue hardship test of Title Vll); Booth, 327
F.3d at 381 (holding that the prison officials' safety concerns were adequate to pass
the rational basis test).
137. See GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 273; Booth, 327 F.3d at 381. As indicated
earlier in this Note, Booth pertained to a plaintiffs religious expression claims that
were not brought under Title VII. Id at 378. However, the Fourth Circuit's
acceptance of the generalized safety concerns of the prison are indicative of the
problems associated with the weak protections offered by Title VII. Id. at 381.
138. Richard Albert, American Separationism and Liberal Democracy: The
Establishment Clause in Historical and Comparative Perspective, 88 MARQ. L. REV.
867, 923-25 (2005) (discussing the historical importance of religious freedom
afforded by "separationism" in America and its virtues at both a personal and
governmental level).
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and should offer more protections for prison workers.139 Additionally,
the holdings and approach in both Booth and GEO Group could
potentially offer courts the opportunity to consider how the significant
difficulty standard proposed by the WRFA would or would not have
altered the outcomes of these cases given the apparent tension between
security and religious expression interests.140
In Booth, the plaintiff was Jonathan F. Booth, a correctional
officer and state employee,141 who contended, in part,142 that he was
religiously discriminated against by the state.14 3 Booth's claim emerged
after he was reprimanded by his supervisors for violating the policies for
139. It must be acknowledged that some courts have closely examined the
legitimacy of security concerns offered by prisons in cases involving employee garb
or grooming policies, albeit in contexts outside of Title VII. For example, in Rourke
v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 615 N.Y.S.2d 470 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994), the
court responded to a prison's requirement that a Native American employee, who
wore his hair long for religious reasons, cut his hair for the sake of security and other
reasons. Id. at 472. The court stated: "Perhaps the most unassailably convincing
evidence in this case is the fact that petitioner himself was allowed, by his former
supervisor, to wear his hair long for 14 months, and in all this time respondents are
unable to point to a single incident illustrative of any problem with security . . . ." Id
at 473. As a result, the court rejected the prison's reasoning for its requirement. Id.
See also Francis v. Keane, 888 F. Supp. 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying prison's
motion for summary judgment due to lack of sufficient evidence as to security issues
where two Rastafarian prison employees brought a claim under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 because the prison instructed them to change their
religiously-motivated hairstyles).
140. See GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 274-77 (relying on broad assertions of
safety concerns in affirming summary judgement in favor of defendants); Booth, 327
F.3d at 381 (suggesting that the generalized security issues cited by defendants were
sufficient in overcoming the plaintiffs claims).
141. Booth, 327 F.3d at 378.
142. It is important to note in this discussion that Booth presented a successful
claim in this particular case. The Fourth Circuit held "that evidence in the record
showed that the Department had previously granted other officers religious
exemptions to the hair policy . . . [and] the Department applied a facially neutral
policy in an unconstitutional manner." Booth v. Maryland, 337 F. App'x. 301, 303
(4th Cir. 2009). As a result of this holding, "[t]he parties thereafter entered into a
settlement agreement in which the State of Maryland agreed to provide Booth a
religious accommodation from its grooming policy." along with other concessions.
Id. at 303. As the subsequent analysis presented in this Note expresses, despite this
positive result for Booth, the security issues presented in the case remain troubling.
143. See Booth, 327 F.3d 377.
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employee grooming at the prison facility in which he worked.'44 Booth's
specific workplace violation surrounded his decision to "wear[] his hair
in dreadlocks"l 4 5 as an apparent reflection of his Rastafarianism.146 In
seeking to explain his maintenance of this particular hairstyle to prison
officials,147 Booth claimed that "his Rastafarian religion required him to
wear his hair in dreadlocks and requested a reasonable accommodation to
wear his hair in accordance with his religious beliefs."14 8 Based on these
overall facts, it would not be a stretch for one to maintain that, at least to
some degree, Booth's religious beliefs and faith-based motivations for
choosing to wear his hair in dreadlocks were genuine.149
Furthermore, Booth was able to highlight in his suit what
appeared to be rather compelling claims that the grooming policy at issue
was not applied equally by the State" 0 and that the discipline he received
for his religiously motivated hairstyle was somewhat atypical.'' The
opinion surmises Booth's assertion against the prison in the following
manner:
[T]he defendants violated his First Amendment
rights by refusing his request for an
accommodation to wear his hair in modified
144. See id
145. Id. at 378.
146. Id. at 379. In particular, Rastafarian dreadlocks have been described as
"rope-like strands" of hair. Donald L. Beschle, Paradigms Lost: The Second Circuit
Faces the New Era of Religion Clause Jurisprudence, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 547, 557
n.58 (1991) (quoting Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571, 573 (2d Cir. 1990)). The
significance of wearing dreadlocks to some Rastafarians appears to be "that
dreadlocks are integral not only to their religious identity but to their whole racial
and cultural identity ..... Derek O'Brien & Vaughan Carter, Chant Down Babylon:
Freedom of Religion and the Rastafarian Challenge to Majoritarianism, 18 J.L. &
RELIGION. 219, 232 (2002).
147. Booth, 327 F.3d at 379.
148. Id.
149. In fact, Booth, in a separate and later case involving alleged
discrimination by correctional facility officials, "filed a Title VII claim . . . alleging
failure to accommodate, disparate treatment, hostile religious environment, and
retaliation against the Department." Booth v. Maryland, 337 F. App'x 301, 305 (4th
Cir. 2009). These claims appeared to have been based primarily on Booth's belief
that his choice to wear dreadlocks to work was the reason for being "removed from
the position of acting lieutenant" at the facility. See id. at 308-12.




dreadlocks, that the request was not unreasonable
because similarly situated females are allowed to
wear their hair braided and substantially longer
than the dreadlocks he wears, and that the
defendants have not enforced the policy against
approximately thirteen similarly-situated
employees who have violated the policy but who
have not been disciplined.15
In reference to the disparate treatment of other employees, Booth
specifically claimed that the defendants had permitted two male
employees, one Jewish and the other of the Sikh faith, to maintain long
facial hair. 11 Booth contended that the defendants also allowed the Sikh
to wear a turban during the course of his employment and the employee
who was Jewish to wear "long sideburns."l 54 Thus, the totality of
Booth's claim asserted that his efforts to maintain the hairstyle urged by
his faith were not completely incompatible with existing employee
accommodations at the facility.' Such an assertion was reasonable
based on the apparent manner in which the prison had allowed other
employees to wear certain hair and facial hair styles in accordance with
either their beliefs or gender.156
Despite the compelling nature of the above claims and the
defendants' past accommodations in the workplace, the court appeared to
favor the state's security-based arguments.15 7 While the applicable part
of the opinion focuses primarily on pleading issues involving claims
under the First Amendment and Title VII, 58 the court suggests that there
was no basis for assuming that the grooming policies adopted by the
defendants were created in order to discriminate against the religious
expression rights of employees adhering to certain faiths.159 The court
152. Id.
153. Id. at 380-81.
154. Id. at 381.
155. See id. at 380-81.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 381.
158. See id. at 382 (discussing the fact that the district court erred having
"implicitly ruled that Booth had not made an 'as applied' challenge to the
defendants' application of the policy to him because such a challenge can only be
brought under Title VII").
159. See id. at 381.
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contends, "There is no evidence that the Division developed the policy to
regulate or prohibit religious activities, including Booth's practice of
Rastafarianism, and the defendants presented persuasive evidence that
DCD 50-43 was likely adopted for the neutral secular purposes of
promoting public safety, discipline, and esprit de corps."' 60 Although it
is true that the court underscored in its opinion that the district court
erred in failing to consider the fact that the plaintiff offered evidence
suggesting the defendants' grooming policy was not applied equally,16 1
the fact remains that the defendants and the court alike seemed to justify
the policy in question on the grounds of general statements pertaining to
safety.162 Furthermore, the court failed to either list or analyze the
proffered security concerns of the defendants and impliedly accepted
their safety justifications as sufficient.' This result is alarming given the
idea that the prison essentially sacrificed Booth's religious expression
rights in the workplace for the sake of broad and undefined security
164concerns.
In conjunction with the above assertions, the subjection of
Booth's rights of religious expression to certain employment policies
becomes even more unsettling when one examines the actual security
interests that were maintained by the defendants before the district
court. Specifically, the defendants made what appears to have been a
rather vague statement as to the safety threats that the plaintiffs
dreadlocks presented in the prison context. The defendants stated "that
requiring guards to have traditional military or law enforcement
hairstyles allows them to be distinguished from prisoners during
160. Id. "DCD 50-43" represents the "dress code and grooming policy" of
"Maryland's Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, Division of
Pretrial Detention and Services." Id. at 378-379.
161. See id. at 381 ("Booth presented at least some evidence that the legitimate
secular purposes underlying the policy have been abandoned in a manner that favors
other religions over his religion and, therefore, that the policy has been applied to
him in an unconstitutional manner.").
162. Id.
163. See id.
164. See Booth v. Maryland, 207 F. Supp. 2d 394, 398-99 (D. Md. 2002), affd
in part, rev'd in part, 327 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 2003).
165. See id.
166. See id.
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attempted uprisings or escapes.,,16 While the defendants did not offer
any other justification related directly to security concerns,168 the court
accepted the defendants' generalized rationale on the grounds that it
satisfied the "low burden" required of the defendants. While it is true
that the district court subjected the defendants to the rational basis test
and not the undue hardship test of Title VII in its decision,170 the undue
hardship standard would have yielded a similar ruling had it been
applied."' The latter contention is rooted in the reality that the district
court openly acknowledged in its opinion that "the defendants'
explanation that guards with dreadlocks might be confused with
prisoners during an uprising or attempted breakout might be considered
questionable and its elaboration in the present record of its policy
rationales is sparse."' 72 In essence, based on such a recognition and the
district court's subsequent acceptance of the sufficiency of the
defendants' justifications,173 it seems the defendants would have met the
present "de minimis cost" showing required by Title VII. 174
In conjunction with the above decision highlighting potentially
minimal protections for the religiously motivated hairstyles of prison
employees under Title VII, it is also crucial to consider the similarly
weak protections afforded to prison workers as to faith-based garb.17 1 In
E.E.O.C. v. GEO Group, Inc.,176 from the Third Circuit, "a class of
167. Id. at 398.
168. See id. at 398-99 (stating that "the defendants offer testimony that ...
[military] hairstyles engender respect from prisoners and foster esprit de corps")
(citation omitted).
169. Id. at 399.
170. See id. at 398 ("The challenged rules are rationally related to the
division's legitimate interests in public safety, discipline and esprit de corps.").
171. See Webb v. Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256, 259-60 (3d Cir. 2009) ("An
accommodation constitutes an 'undue hardship' if it would impose more than a de
minimis cost on the employer.") (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432
U.S. 63, 84 (1977)).
172. Booth, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 399.
173. See id.
174. Webb, 562 F.3d at 260 (citing Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84).
175. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. GEO Group, Inc. 616 F.3d 265, 275 (3d Cir. 2010)
(holding that, despite the apparently sincere religiously-motivated desires of prison
employees to wear head coverings at work, the prison's security interests were
sufficient to outweigh the employees' interests under Title VII).
176. 616 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2010).
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Muslim women employees" challenged the "dress code" for prison
workers at the prison in which they worked. 17 7 In particular, this policy
required that employees refrain from wearing various apparel that would
effectively cover one's head during workplace responsibilities. The
employer claimed that the policy functioned to keep employees from
wearing "khimars" even though some consider these "head coverings"
to be "required by the Islamic religion."180 The Muslim women saw the
policy as an affront to their rights of religious expression in the
workplace and claimed that the uniform requirements "violated Title
VII's prohibitions on religious discrimination" as it did not grant "them
an exception." 82
A close examination of the employer's dress code and the
specific facts that formed the background of the case is quite disturbing
and raises concerns about how insensitive to religious expression
employee clothing policies can potentially be in the prison environment.
In particular, one of the Muslim employees in GEO Group was hired as a
nurse in the prison and was assured upon hiring that her wearing of a
khimar would not be problematic.183 She suggested in a very clear
manner, at the time she was hired, that her decision to wear this form of
religious garb was imperative in her religion and that she would not
cease such an expression even for the sake of her employment.184 After
being hired and permitted to wear her khimar in the prison facility for
what appears to have been less than a year, this employee took a leave of
absence from work. 8 5 She was informed afterward that she would be
177. Id. at 267-68.
178. See id.
179. Id. "The headscarf (a khimar or hijaab) is a traditional headcovering
worn by Muslim women." Webb v. Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256, 258 (3d Cir. 2009).
For further background discussion on the khimar and its significance in the Muslim
faith, see Alexandra Marin, Note, Religious Discrimination or Effective Law
Enforcement? The Appeal of a Muslim Police Officer to Wear Her Khimar On-Duty
Awaits Decision by Federal Judges: Kimberlie Webb v. City of Philadelphia, Civil
Action No. 07-3081 (March 14, 2008), 10 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 183, 184 n.1 1
(2008) (providing a general discussion of religious origins of the khimar).
180. GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 268.
181. See id.
182. Id. at 267.
183. See id. at 268.
184. See id. at 268-69.
185. Id.
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able to return to her job but could no longer work in her head
covering. After resisting these terms for resuming her active
employment at the prison, she was summarily fired for failing to comply
with her employer's orders.8
Similarly, two other female Muslim employees at the facility in
question were informed in 2005 that they were not permitted to wear
their head coverings in the prison during the course of their
employment. The instruction was a surprise to one of these
employees. 189 She had interviewed for her position at the prison while
wearing both a "khimar and a veil."l 90 The record suggests that the
individual who interviewed her for the position inquired whether she
would be willing to work without the veil - a question to which she
responded affirmatively and subsequently seems to have complied with
during the course of her employment.' 9 1 Apparently this interview did
not include any suggestion that the woman's khimar posed any problems
for her employment, and she wore the khimar at the facility "for the first
five years of her employment."' 92 She learned from a coworker in 2005
that she could no longer wear the head covering to the prison as a result
of the facility's clothing policy.1 93 The prison warden subsequently told
her that she would be fired if she failed to comply. 194 The employee took
a leave of absence from her job due to the strain the policy caused her.'95
As a product of the constraints of the facility's policy, this employee
eventually returned to work and complied with the dictates of the
prison's restrictive uniform guidelines.196 A similar result also occurred
in the case of the woman who elected to adorn the "underscarf' 1 97 with
186. Id.
187. See id.
188. Specifically, one of the two women wore a khimar to work, while the
other was described in the record as adorning a "a triangle shaped underscarf that she
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her uniform.' 9 8 This employee chose to forgo wearing her head covering
after the warden allegedly informed her she would be "suspended
without pay"'99 if she did not follow the policy in question.200
After suit was filed on the claim that the clothing policy of the
facility "violated Title VII's prohibitions on religious discrimination,"2 0'
the prison sought to justify its restrictive policies primarily on the
202
grounds of safety concerns. Specifically, the warden testified at trial
that the reasons for the head covering prohibition centered on the fear
that headgear could be used to conceal contraband and weapons;203 make
it difficult to differentiate between prisoners and workers on the facility's
204monitoring systems; and, at least in the case of khimars, be used as
205
weapons themselves. GEO Group, Inc., the "private company that
,206 207
was contracted to run"206 the prison at issue, also added that the
clothing policy for prison workers helped to foster a degree of
208
consistency in appearance among employees. In essence, the facility
used these largely security-based justifications as a means of attempting
to prove that granting certain exemptions to Muslim female workers
under the clothing policy209 was not imperative given what amounted to
,,210 211
an "undue hardship defense' to allowing such accommodation.
In considering the various interests at stake, the Third Circuit
ultimately ruled in favor of the prison facility, 212 accepting as sufficient
the weight of its security concerns in relation to the infringement of the
uniform policy on the employee's rights of religious expression in the




201. Id. at 270.
202. See id.
203. Id. at 272.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 267.
207. Id.
208. See id. at 273.
209. See id. at 274.
210. Id. at 273.
211. See id.
212. Id. at 277.




interests on both sides made "this a close case, it stated that "the kind
of delicate balance called for"215 between the competing arguments had
to involve, as the United States Supreme Court suggested in Bell v.
Wolfish, 2 16 "only limited inquiry into prison management because '[t]he
wide range of "judgment calls" that meet constitutional and statutory
requirements are confided to officials outside of the Judicial Branch of
Government."'217 With this considerable degree of deference afforded to
the prison, the Third Circuit then proceeded to rely 2 18 on its own 2009
ruling in Webb v. City of Philadelphia.219 The court characterized Webb
as asserting "that notwithstanding the sincere religious beliefs of the
plaintiff police officer of the need to wear a khimar, that belief was
subordinate to the police department's policy prohibiting the wearing of
a khimar because" 220 of the pressing importance of security. 221 As such,
the GEO Group court highlights the testimony of the wardens of the
22facility at issue, implying that they and GEO were "entitled to attempt
to prevent"223 even "a small threat of the asserted dangers"224 potentially
225posed by khimars. Thus, while the court suggested that the case was
C4 ,226"close, its apparent deference to notions of safety seem to have made
227this an easier case for the court than is stated. The latter contention is
supported by the court's own acknowledgement in the opinion, which
states that "[a] religious accommodation that creates a genuine safety or
security risk can undoubtedly constitute an undue hardship for an
employer-prison."228 This position can be construed, therefore, as
214. Id. at 275.
215. Id.
216. 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979).
217. GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 275 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 562).
218. See id.
219. 562 F.3d 256, 264 (3d Cir. 2009). For further background information
surrounding the Webb decision, see Marin, supra note 179, at 8 (providing
background and analysis of the case prior to the Third Circuit ruling).
220. GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 275.
221. See id.
222. See id. at 275-76.
223. Id. at 274.
224. Id.
225. See id.
226. Id. at 275.
227. See id.
228. Id. at 273.
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exemplifying the manner in which the inherently weak undue hardship
standard of Title VII can render prison security concerns as virtually
insurmountable for prison employees when seeking accommodation for
certain faith-based garb.
III. WHAT THE WRFA COULD AND SHOULD MEAN FOR RELIGIOUS
ACCOMMODATION FOR PRISON WORKERS AS TO GROOMING AND GARB
In light of this overall analysis of the WRFA and the recent
cases, Booth v. Maryland and E.E.O.C. v. GEO Group, Inc., how should
courts balance the legitimate security concerns in the prison context and
the substantial religious expression rights of prison employees if the
WRFA is made into law? More specifically, how should courts frame the
legal arguments and interests of the parties involved in these types of
cases and appropriately incorporate the heightened standard of review
that the WRFA would seem to demand? As the aforementioned
examination has sought to demonstrate, the apparent tension between the
WRFA and the reasoning offered by the courts in Booth and GEO Group
rests in the potential interplay between the significant difficulty standard
of the WRFA and the deference that courts have seemingly been apt to
give to generalized claims of prison security concerns. It is submitted
here that, were the WRFA enacted and the significant difficulty test
formally incorporated into the proposed Act, the proper legal approach
for courts would be to take a probing and discerning look at the security
concerns offered by prison facilities. As such, it appears that courts
would need to require at least some degree of specificity from prison
229
employers as to the grounds for the safety concerns presented.
The above position appears founded, in part, on the fact that at
least one federal judge230 has alluded strongly that a more scrutinizing
judicial approach should already be taken by courts under the current
undue hardship standard of Title VII.231 Specifically, the dissenting judge
in GEO Group maintained that prison employers should be tasked with
assuming "the burden of proving the existence of the asserted safety
229. See id. at 277 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
230. The dissenting opinion in GEO Group provides compelling support for
the difficulties created when courts elect to readily accept prison security claims. See
id. at 277-92.
231. See id.
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concerns, as well as of the fact and magnitude of the asserted hardship in
accommodating plaintiffs religious needs." 23 2 This heightened approach
would seem appropriate for the standard of significant difficulty in that it
would serve to reflect the WRFA's apparent intention to make employers
offer more substantial foundations in justifying decisions to curtail
workplace religious expression.2 33 Furthermore, such a probing judicial
approach would help to ensure that security concerns are truly legitimate,
neither "pretextual" nor "highly speculative,"2 34 and not amounting to
"post-hoc safety rationale."23 5 Such an interest seems warranted due to
the fact that the reasoning of courts in cases such as Booth and GEO
Group, "in effect, establishes a per se rule that when an employer asserts
that its rationale for denying a religious accommodation is safety, the
employer need not adduce any evidence to prove the existence of, let
alone the magnitude of, the burden it would suffer by accommodating the
religious practice." 23 6 In essence, eliciting from prison employers
detailed facts that underscore their security rationale would serve to
create legal grounds upon which judicial balancing of religious
expression rights are more faithfully weighed against legitimate safety
considerations necessary in prison facilities.
With this suggested judicial approach to interpreting and
applying the significant difficulty test, it is essential to also highlight the
fact that courts and prison officials alike need to fundamentally
reexamine whether or not security interests are truly as pressing in the
prison context237 when an employee's religious garb or grooming is at
232. Id. at 277.
233. See Foltin, supra note 1, at 76 ("In assuring that employers have a
meaningful obligation to reasonably accommodate their employees' religious
practices, WRFA will restore to Title Vii's religious-accommodation provision the
weight that Congress originally intended.").
234. GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 278 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 285.
236. Id. (referring specifically to the majority opinion in GEO Group).
237. This suggestion is not to assert that safety is not of paramount importance
in the prison context. Instead, this perspective is intended to further argue that
religious expression is too inherently essential as an individual right to be
subordinated without some degree of probing inquiry.
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issue as is sometimes implied in judicial opinions. As the dissent
highlights in GEO Group, for example, there appeared to have been
nothing in the record to substantiate the claims by the wardens of the
facility that there existed security concerns related to the wearing of
khimars by the employees in question.239 Specifically, in regards to at
least two of the Muslim women employees in the prison, neither one
appeared to have consistently been "within the secure perimeter of the
prison' during her course of employment, a fact that suggests that
they were not frequently present in the areas of the facility where
prisoner contact with employees would necessitate heightened security
concerns.242 The dissent also notes that there was no evidence that any of
the problems actually recorded in the prison related to the smuggling of
contraband, weapons, or other items of concern were causally linked to
243
the wearing of religiously-motivated head coverings, such as khimars.
Similarly, had the court reviewed the record "with the healthy
skepticism'244 advocated by the dissent245 and supported in this overall
discourse, it could have recognized that "[t]he potential risk for obscured
identity created by allowing a handful of correctional officers to wear
underscarves does not remotely compare with the same risk created by
issuing to or permitting the wearing of hats by hundreds of inmates." 24 6
One could claim that this perspective clearly underscores the proposition
that some courts take the security issues raised by prison officials as a
given, even to the point that they ignore occasions where safety concerns
fail even to be rational. Construed in this manner, it seems especially
essential for the WRFA's significant difficulty test to be judicially
construed as entailing searching review of the record when prison
security concerns collide with the religious expression rights of prison
employees.
238. See GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 274 ("Even assuming khimars present only
a small threat of the asserted dangers, they do present a threat which is something
that GEO is entitled to attempt to prevent.").





244. Id. at 287.
245. Id. at 287-88.
246. Id. at 288.
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A consideration of the rationale advanced in Booth raises similar
questions about the actual substance, validity, and overall legitimacy of
safety concerns when an employee's faith-based grooming practices are
under scrutiny. The Fourth Circuit appeared to support the reasoning of
the district court in the case,247 which held that the security concerns of
the prison facility in preventing Booth from wearing dreadlocks were
248
sufficient and should be upheld. The latter is particularly troublesome
and indicative of the need for courts to more fully probe the security
justifications of prisons in these types of cases, given that the district
court openly stated: "While the defendants' explanation that guards with
dreadlocks might be confused with prisoners during an uprising or
attempted breakout might be considered questionable and its elaboration
in the present record of its policy rationales is sparse, the defendants
have met their low burden." 24 9 There was evidence in the record from the
district court,250 subsequently acknowledged by the Fourth Circuit,21
that the prison facility in question had provided religious accommodation
212
for the religiously-motivated grooming choices of other employees.
An examination of the opinions of both the district court253 and the
Fourth Circuit254 reveals that neither attempted to thoroughly consider
how it was that Booth's dreadlocks would have caused any more
uncertainty as to the identity of prisoners and guards "during an uprising
or attempted breakout" 25 5 than the faith-based grooming practices
already permitted of other prison employees.256 It is fair to maintain that,
247. See Booth v. Maryland, 327 F.3d 377, 381 (4th Cir. 2003).
248. See Booth v. Maryland, 327 F. Supp. 2d 394, 399 (D. Md. 2002).
249. Id.
250. See id. at 398-99.
251. See Booth, 327 F.3d at 380-81.
252. See id.
253. See Booth, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 399.
254. See Booth, 327 F.3d at 380-8 1.
255. Booth, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 399.
256. See Booth, 327 F.3d at 380-81 (explaining that "similarly situated females
are allowed to wear their hair braided and substantially longer than the dreadlocks he
wears"). As highlighted earlier in this Note, see supra note 150 and accompanying
text, the Third Circuit did hold that "the Department applied a facially neutral policy
in an unconstitutional manner." Booth v. Maryland, 337 F. App'x 303, 303 (4th Cir.
2009). However, this section of the opinion does not significantly raise security
issues. See also Booth, 327 F.3d at 380-83 (noting that the policy was selective in
when it was enforced).
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were an employee to bring a similar claim under Title VII, the significant
difficulty test of the WRFA suggests courts would have to press prison
authorities on the latter types of glaring gaps in security rationales and
adequately bear "the burden of proving the existence of the asserted
safety concerns."257
It must be noted that this overall discussion of the need for both
greater protections of the religious expression rights of employees in
prison facilities and more searching judicial examination of the
258
legitimacy of safety concerns does have a relevant legal basis.
Specifically, "Section 3 of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000"259 or "RLUIPA"260 provides additional evidence of
"congressional efforts to accord religious exercise heightened protection
from government-imposed burdens" 26 1 in the prison context. In
particular, RLUIPA, deemed constitutional262 by the United States
263
Supreme Court in Cutter v. Wilkinson, maintains in a portion of
Section 3264 that "' [no] government shall impose a substantial burden on
the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an
institution,' unless the burden furthers 'a compelling governmental
interest,' and does so by 'the least restrictive means."'265 As the Supreme
257. E.E.O.C. v. GEO Group, 616 F.3d 265, 277 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
258. As acknowledged later in this discussion, one of the clear differences
between RLUIPA and the WRFA pertains to the fact that RLUIPA protects the
incarcerated, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(a)(1), (2) (2006), whose freedom of religious
expression is restricted in ways that are not identical to the challenges of expression
faced by prison employees. See Morgan F. Johnson, Heaven Help Us: The Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act's Prisoners Provisions in the Aftermath
of the Supreme Court's Decision in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 14 AM. U.J. GENDER Soc.
POL'Y & L. 585, 591-92 (2006) (citing 146 Cong. Rec. S7774-01, S7775 (daily ed.
July 27, 2000)) ("Congress based the need for RLUIPA on three years of hearings,
which concluded that inmates were at the mercy of prison officials, who often
imposed arbitrary rules regarding the right to practice religion."). However,
consideration of the legal basis for RLUIPA assists in highlighting some arguments
in favor of greater judicial protections for prison employees under the WRFA.
259. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 712 (2005).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 714.
262. Id. at 732-33.
263. 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
264. See id at 712.
265. Id. (quoting RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2)(2006)).
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Court has noted,266 'RLUIPA thus protects institutionalized persons who
are unable freely to attend to their religious needs and are therefore
dependent on the government's permission and accommodation for
exercise of their religion."267 RLUIPA asserts the premise that those
within the coercive prison context,268 specifically prisoners, warrant
269
formal protections that ensure their First Amendment rights.
In Cutter, the plaintiffs were former and current inmates who
were "adherents of 'nonmainstream' religions: the Satanist, Wicca, and
Asatru religions, and the Church of Jesus Christ Christian." 2 70 These
plaintiffs alleged, inter alia,271 that, while in prison, officials prevented
them from adhering to and openly practicing various manifestations of
their faiths, including making certain clothing choices and reading
religiously oriented literature.272 In considering these claims, as well as
273
the overall dictates of RLUIPA, the Supreme Court did note that
RLUTPA does not act to "elevate accommodation of religious
observances over an institution's need to maintain order and safety." 2 74
However, implicit in the Court's reasoning is the notion that statements
of a prison's desire for or concerns over "order and safety,"275 in and of
themselves, are not justifications for suppressing an inmate's religious
276
expression rights. This idea is reflected in the fact, as one
commentator has noted, "RLUIPA incorporates the Supreme Court's
standard for substantial burden, which asks whether government action
(1) puts pressure on individuals to modify their religious behavior or (2)
prevents them from engaging in religious conduct in a way that is greater
than a mere inconvenience." 27 7 It is valid to contend that the central
266. See id. at 721.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 714-17.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 712.
271. See id. at 713.
272. Id.
273. See id. at 719-26.
274. Id. at 722.
275. Id.
276. See id. at 724-26.
277. Derek L. Gaubatz, RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success and
Constitutionality of RLUIPA's Prisoner Provisions, 28 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y
501, 534 (2005).
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premise of RLUIPA is that "the State does not have the right to seek to
bind and control the religious beliefs and acts of conscience of those
individuals"278 incarcerated in the nation's prisons.279 Additionally, it is
fair to assert that the Court in Cutter subtly recognized the validity of the
latter general idea in its claim that if "inmate requests for religious
accommodations become excessive, impose unjustified burdens on other
institutionalized persons, or jeopardize the effective functioning of an
institution, the facility would be free to resist the imposition"280 under
RLUIPA.281 By using the language of "excessive" and "unjustified
,,282
burdens, the Court appears to suggest that, even in the required
balancing that the judiciary must undertake between security interests
283
and prisoners' rights to religious practice, facilities must actually
articulate a sufficient basis for their safety concerns to withstand
RLUIPA-based claims.284
The aforementioned analysis is crucial to the argument that
courts should interpret the WRFA, should it become law, in a manner
that places a heavier burden of justification on prisons when they
infringe upon the religious expression rights of inmates. Specifically,
such a position is rooted in how prisoners' grooming and garb claims
278. Id. at 607.
279. See id.
280. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 726.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. See id. at 720-23.
284. See, e.g., Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 800 (7th Cir. 2008) (requiring, in
reference to dietary restrictions placed on a religiously observant inmate by a prison,
that the prison establish that it pursued "the least restrictive means of furthering a
compelling governmental interest" in seeking to maintain "good order"); Lovelace v.
Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 191 (4th Cir. 2006) ("[W]e have no sworn statement from the
warden, the assistant warden, or any other prison official that discusses any security,
safety, or cost consideration that justifies the restrictions in the Ramadan policy.
That is the fundamental problem presented in this appeal . . . ."); United States v.
Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1131 (10th Cir. 2002) (suggesting, in its interpretation of
the now repealed Religious Freedom Restoration Act, that, in regards to the burden
on officials in stating their claim,' "[t]he government bears the burden of building a
record that proves that the statutory and regulatory scheme in question is the least
restrictive means of advancing the government's compelling interests").
SEARCHING FOR SECURITY
have "played out" in some courts under RLUIPA.285 As one
commentator has maintained:
Prisons generally assert that limiting beard and hair
length removes a hiding place for contraband and
helps to prevent inmates from changing their
appearance (which could aid their ability to
escape). Thus far, the majority of cases to resolve
this issue under RLUIPA have held that prisons
have failed to carry their burden of proof on this
issue. Although they have accepted that the
prisons' asserted reasons may sometimes satisfy
strict scrutiny, the majority of courts have held that
that a flat prohibition on religious exemptions from
grooming policies without regard to either (1) the
length of the requested beard or haircut or (2)
whether exemptions are allowed for medical
286
reasons may not satisfy strict scrutiny.
The above results under RLUIPA suggest that at least some
courts since the Act's passage have elected to take a harder look at the
record to determine whether the proffered security concerns of prisons
truly outweigh religious liberty interests or should be tempered by
genuine efforts of accommodation.287 This general trend is significant in
this overall analysis because it provides a relevant framework for courts
to reference when analyzing potential religious expression claims by
prison workers under the WRFA. Specifically, it seems sensible that if
courts are more willing to probe the proffered security concerns of prison
officials to a relatively extensive degree under RLUIPA as a result of a
285. See Gaubatz, supra note 277, at 560.
286. Id.
287. See id.; see, e.g., Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 190 ("The defendants have not
adequately demonstrated on this record that the Ramadan policy is the least
restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest . . . . [T]hey do
not present any evidence with respect to the policy's security or budget
implications.") (citation omitted); Mayweathers v. Terhune, 328 F. Supp. 2d 1086,
1095 (E.D. Cal. 2004) ("Because I conclude above that the plaintiffs have made a
sufficient showing that the regulations are an exaggerated response to defendants'
security concerns, it follows that defendants have not demonstrated that the
regulations are the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental
interest.").
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prisoner's freedom of expression claim, a parallel approach should be
assumed in the WRFA jurisprudence for prison employees. While prison
employees do not arguably "encounter undue impediments to their
religious observances"2 88 to the same extent as prisoners, legitimate
reasoning is not readily apparent for restricting forms of employee
religious expression in the workplace that are similar to those that may
be allowed from prisoners.289 In essence, if the religious freedom-based
garb and grooming claims of prisoners must trigger a greater showing of
safety concerns on the part of a prison, it would be nonsensical from a
legal perspective not to treat the significant difficulty test of the WRFA
as requiring the same.
CONCLUSION
What the effect will be on the religious expression rights of
prison. employees, if the WRFA is made into law, remains to be seen.
However, as Booth v. Maryland and E.E.O.C. v. GEO Group, Inc. clearly
demonstrate, the present judicial approach to "protecting" the garb and
grooming rights of prison employees is untenable. In a nation that often
seems to take great pride in its historical reverence for First Amendment
rights, it is not an overstatement to claim that the legal standards applied
in the latter cases fail to embody the constitutional protections valued by
Americans. While the safety and security interests of prisons are
certainly legitimate and worthy of great respect, the religious expression
interests of prison employees are too inherently meaningful for courts to
sacrifice without demanding more. Perhaps the case-by-case analysis and
discerning examination of the proffered interests of prisons proposed in
this Note is not the only approach that would effectively advance the
religious expression rights of prison employees. Yet, at the very least,
maybe the latter approach could provide a time in the future where the
judiciary will more actively "search for security."
288. Stout, supra note 113, at 1204.
289. See E.E.O.C. v. GEO Group, Inc., 616 F.3d 265, 288 (Tashima, J.,
dissenting) ("The potential risk for obscured identity created by allowing a handful
of correctional officers to wear underscarves does not remotely compare with the
same risk created by issuing to or permitting the wearing of hats by hundreds of
inmates.").
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